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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Eugenio Caliz-Bautista appeals following jury trial, because the district court erred in 
excluding the testimony of the defendant' s expert witness. Dr. Greg Hampikian, an expert in 
DNA testing, was prevented from explaining to the jury how the testing done in this case did not 
minimize the risk of contamination, that such contamination would not be caught by the lab' s 
preventative measures, and that it would be impossible, after the fact, to tell whether the DNA 
results presented to the jury were the product of contamination. 
At trial Caliz was acquitted of Count 1: Lewd Conduct with a Minor, which alleged that 
Caliz raped E.M. However, Caliz was convicted of Count 2: Sexual Abuse of a Minor for 
allegedly kissing E.M. ' s breast. Although the E.M. testified that Caliz had committed both 
counts, the jury only convicted Caliz of the count which was purportedly supported by DNA 
evidence. Caliz appeals requesting the conviction be vacated because of the district court' s error 
that prevented the jury from hearing the testimony of the defendant' s expert witness. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in the 
Appellant's Brief, and are incorporated here by reference. 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err, and violate Caliz-Bautista' s constitutional right to present 
evidence in his defense, when it prevented Dr. Hampikian from testifying because 
contamination had been placed into issue by the State? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
The district court erred, and violate Caliz-Bautista's constitutional right to present evidence in 
his defense, when it prevented Dr. Hampikian from testifying because contamination had been 
placed ihto issue by the State. 
A. Introduction. constitutional right to present evidence. 
The broadest and most foundational protection of a defendant ' s right to present evidence 
is afforded by the United State' s Constitution and the Idaho Constitution. U.S. Const.amend VI. 
The right to present evidence goes to the heart of our jury system, and "is a fundamental element 
ofdueprocessoflaw." Washingtonv. Texas, 388U.S.14, 19(1967). 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence "generally govern the admission of all evidence in the 
courts of this State," and thus refine a defendant ' s broadly protected right to present a defense. 
State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 240 (2009). However, the rules of procedure and evidence may 
conflict with a defendant's right to present a defense if the rules are "arbitrary or 
disproportionate to the purposes they serve." US. v. Scheffer, 523 U.S . 303, 308 (1998). 
In the present case, should the district court's decision regarding the admissibility be 
upheld, it would open the Idaho Rules of Evidence to this type of constitutional attack. However, 
there are narrower ground upon which the case may be decided, which makes it unnecessary to 
elaborate on the fundamental error or balancing the accused' s constitutionally protected interests 
against the state interests. Suffice it to say, that preventing a defendant from presenting expert 
testimony that the method of analysis "compromised the evidence analysis in this case" would 
infringe upon a weighty interest of the accused. See Tr. Pp. 478-479. 
B. Standard of Review, de novo review within the context of review for abuse of 
discretion 
Idaho case law is replete with citations that admission of evidence is reviewed on appeal 
under the abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Perry, l 50 Idaho 209 (201 O); State v. 
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Gleason, 123 Idaho 62 (1992); State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559 (2007). Similarly, admission of 
expert testimony has been reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard in the past. See State v. 
Varie , 135 Idaho 848 (2001); State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873 (1995); State v. Crea, 119 Idaho 
352 (1991). However, nestled within the second prong of the abuse of discretion analysis is a 
determination that the court acted "consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific 
choices it had." Varie, 135 Idaho at 853. 
In the present case, the applicable legal standards included the Idaho Rules of Evidence, 
and a determination ofrelevance. See I.R.E. 401 , 402, and 702; State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584 
(2013). Interpretation of the Idaho Rules of Evidence is reviewed de novo. State v. Moore , 131 
Idaho 814 (1998). "[R]elevance of evidence is not a discretionary matter" and the court on 
appeal "will review the question ofrelevancy de novo." State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 
764 (1993). 
Thus, the standard of review in this case funnels to a de novo review of the district court's 
application of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, and determination ofrelevance. However, even 
under the abuse of discretion standard, the district court erred. 
C. The district court erred in excluding Dr. Hampikian's testimony because it did not act 
consistently the applicable legal standards for admission under Rule 702. 
Admission of expert testimony is governed by consideration of two factors: (1) whether 
the expert is qualified to testify on the subject, and (2) whether the expert's testimony will assist 
the tier of fact. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 599 (2013). The Daubert Court noted that the 
seconq factor "goes primarily to relevance," and one aspect of such a relevancy analysis is 
"whether expert testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it 
will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. , Inc. , 509 U.S. 
579, 5r0-91 (1993). 
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Abuse of discretion: application of multiple incorrect standards. 
While considering whether to exclude the testimony of Dr. Hampikian, the district court 
articulated numerous standards instead of using the legal standard set out above. The district first 
stated that the standard for admission was "reasonable degree of scientific certainty." 
It is the burden of the defense, to make a sufficient showing that the expert 
would testify that there was likely contamination within a reasonable degree of 
scientific certainty before the testimony of Dr. Hampikian would be relevant and 
admissible. 
Memo.p. 7. 
Later while ruling on the motion, the district court stated that "expert testimony is 
speculative when it theorizes about a matter as to which evidence is not sufficient for certain 
knowledge." Tr. p. 541 LL. 8-12. The district court continued that "Dr. Hampikian himself 
testified ... that he cannot quantify the likelihood of contamination in this case and cannot say on 
a more probable than not basis that contamination occurred in this case." Tr. p. 541 LL. 16-20. 
These standards are not legal standards set out in the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The 
district court appeared to be relying on civil law tort cases to fashion these standards. See e.g. 
Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807 (1999); Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs. , 143 Idaho 834 
(2007); Nield v. Pocatello Health Servs., Inc., 156 Idaho 802 (Ct.App. 1992). These cases are 
markedly different from a criminal trial where the prosecutor introduces expert testimony about 
forensic evidence, and the expert is provided to evaluate and discuss the testing done by the 
prosecutor's expert witness. Notably, in criminal cases the state has the burden of production and 
persuasion on all elements. See State v. Huggins, 105 Idaho 43 (1983). 
Under Rule 702 expert testimony is admissible if the expert is qualified and if the assists 
the jury to interpret the evidence of determine an issue of fact. I.R.E. 702. There is no 
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prerequisite that the expert establishes a unique fact by preponderance of the evidence before 
they are allowed to testify as an expert-and actually present testimonial evidence. 
2. Abuse of discretion: weighing evidence instead of considering if the proposed 
testimony is sufficiently tied to facts of case. 
Unlike the standards articulated by the district court below, determining whether the 
expert's testimony will assist the trier of fact "goes primarily to relevance." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 
591. Relevance is not an "issue of credibility or finding of fact that must be resolved in order for 
the trial court to reach a decision." Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho at 764. Analyzing the relevance of 
expert witnesses is done by considering "whether the expert testimony proffered in the case is 
sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute." 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. 
The district court patently understood that "Dr. Hampikian would testify as to the 
possibility of contamination in this case based upon his review of the documentation prepared by 
the Idaho State Lab." Tr. p. 539 LL. 6-12. These facts and data were described as: "the data 
supplied by the State of Idaho and the ISP lab specifically to this case"; "the lab data we received 
in discovery from your office on how this test was conducted and also how it was shipped to the 
lab and handled in the biological testing area as well"; and "all laboratory data sent by the Idaho 
State Police regarding DNA testing in this case." Third Affidavit in Support of Motions in 
Limine, attached Ex. I, R. , 170. Even district court understood the factual basis for the testimony: 
"The defense expert has not conducted an independent testing and has apparently only reviewed 
the information and other documentation provided by the State in the course of discover to 
evalua~e the reliability of the DNA test results." Memo Decision p. 5. 
Unfortunately, the district court found that "it's clear from those records that those 
records do not tell the whole story." Tr. p. 541 L. 24 - p. 542 L. 1. 
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The district court ' s statement is unfortunate because it shows the district court weighing 
the facts used by Dr. Hampikien while considering whether to allow the testimony. These facts 
are the same facts that the State ' s expert witness relied upon-"it would appear to be a matter of 
interpretation of the information and materials relied upon by the State Lab and Dr. Hampikien." 
Memo. Decision p. 6. This weighing was the same weighing that the district court noted as 
inappropriate: 
Well, it is not my job to weigh the testimony of Dr. Hampikien versus any 
other testimony that is offered. The sole purpose of this hearing is for me to 
determine whether or not the testimony is sufficiently supported by facts as to 
take it out of the realm of conjecture or speculation .. .. 
Tr. p. 485 LL. 4-12. Although the district court noted at the offer of proof that the court' s role 
was not to weigh the testimony, that is precisely what occurred during the district court' s ruling: 
I know of no reason why [Dr. Hampikian] could not have consulted with 
the state lab in preparation for his testimony here today, and that did not occur .... 
[It is] not uncommon that other labs may do things differently, [but] that' s not to 
suggest that the Idaho State Lab did not perform these tests in accordance with the 
standards and processes for which they are accredited and approved. 
Tr. p. 542 LL. 1-12. The district court patently weighed against Dr. Hampikian that he had not 
consulted with the state lab, and patently weighed against Dr. Hampikian whether he could 
testify that the standards and processes of the Idaho State Lab had not been followed. Tr. p. 480 
L. 13 -p. 481 L. 19. 
The district court' s statement that "it' s clear from those records that those records do not 
tell the whole story" is also unfortunate because those records were the entirety of the facts and 
data provided to Caliz in discovery. Tr. p. 541 L. 24 - p. 542 L. 1; See also Third Affidavit in 
Suppok of Motions in Limine, attached Ex. I, R. , 170. If those records do not tell the whole 
story-if those records do not give a sufficient factual basis for an independent expert to review 
and fofm an opinion- than Caliz was never provided the whole story-than Caliz was never 
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provided sufficient factual information to access the reliability of the DNA testing even when 
assisted by a competent expert. 
3. Abuse of discretion: unreasoned decision. 
Finally, instead of considering the underlying legal question of whether the expert 
testimony would assist the trier of fact in considering the evidence, the district court contorted its 
reasoni?g to bootstrap an assist-the-trier-of-fact analysis onto the court' s search to find the 
testimony speculative, which would allow it to exclude the testimony. In so doing the district 
court ii,1plicitly concedes that the subjects of the proposed testimony of Dr. Hampikien were 
relevant, and that the review he conducted was based on facts in the record. 
he district court stated: 
It would appear that the assistance of Dr. Hampikian's expertise may 
assist the defense in the cross-examination of the State's DNA expert as concerns 
the reliability of the test results, however, Dr. Hampikian' s proffered testimony in 
the defense case by counsel that there is the "possibility" of contamination would 
not assist the jury. 
Therefore, absent a more sufficient offer of proof, the testimony of Dr. 
Hampikian that there was a possibility of contamination of the DNA samples 
would not be admissible, albeit the information of the defense expert could be 
used by counsel in her cross-examination of the State's DNA expert as to the 
foundational prerequisites for the admission of the test results in the State' s case 
in chief, since it is the burden of the State to prove the accuracy of the test results. 
Memo. Decision p. 7. In a footnote, the court went further to say "Dr. Hampikian' s expert 
testimony could be relevant at trial, for purposes of impeachment of the State' s DNA expert." 
Memo. Decision p. 7 fn. 4. 
For Dr. Hampikian' s expertise to "assist the defense in the cross-examination of the 
State' s DNA expert" two conditions would need to be met: (1) Dr. Hampikian' s input would 
have to be relevant to understanding the evidence that would be put on by the state and the 
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subject of cross-examination, and (2) Dr. Hampikian would have to be using the facts of the case 
that would be presented to the jury at trial. 
~f the district court is taken at its word, "[i]t would appear" that Dr. Hampikian' s 
expertise was relevant to evidence that the state would present at trial, and Dr. Hampikian' s 
opinions would be sufficiently substantiated by facts in the record that it would be helpful in 
understanding and evaluating the testimony of the State' s DNA expert in the adversarial testing 
process of trial. 
The district court' s analysis and holding belie the court' s true impression that Dr. 
Hampikian' s proposed testimony was relevant and substantiated the facts ofthis case. The 
district court lost prospective of the legal standard set out in Rule 702 because it rigidly focused 
on spea~lation instead of considering whether Dr. Hampikian was qualified as an expert, and 
whether his testimony would assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence. See I.R.E. 702; 
State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584 (2013); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. , Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
(1993). In so doing, the district court failed to reach its decision by an exercise ofreason- which 
is evidenced by the district court' s comments that implicitly indicate the court' s impression that 
the Dr. Hampikian' s expert testimony met both factors required for admission under Rule 702. 
D. The district court erred in excluding Dr. Hampikian' s testimony because it did not act 
consistently with the applicable legal standards for admission of impeachment 
evidence. 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence start with the premise that relevant evidence is admissible. 
See I.R.E. 401. This rule protects the foundational right to present evidence at trial. See U.S. 
Const.amend. VI. "Impeachment evidence" is "[e]vidence used to undermine a witness ' s 
credibility." Blacks Law Dictionary, gth ed., p. 597. Likewise, "rebuttal evidence" is " [e]vidence 
offered to disprove or contradict the evidence presented by an opposing party." Id. at 599. 
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In the present case, Caliz sought to admit Dr. Hampikian' s testimony as impeachment 
evidence, in addition to admitting his testimony in the defendant's case-in-chief. Tr. p. 459 LL. 
17-21. While addressing the motion in limine before trial, the district court indicated that "Dr. 
Hampikian' s expert testimony could be relevant at trial, for purposes of impeachment of the 
State's DNA expert." Memo. Decision p.7. Notably, however, during the offer of proof hearing, 
the prosecutor objected and the district judge prevented Dr. Hampikian from evaluating the 
testimony of the State ' s DNA expert. Tr. p. 463 LL. 3-17. The district court simply stated "you 
can offer impeachment evidence at the time of trial. I don't think it ' s relevant now." Tr. p. 463 
LL. 3-1?. 
At trial, the State DNA expert testified to the state lab accreditation. Tr. p. 400 LL. 18-21 ; 
p. 403 LL. 20-23. The DNA expert testified about proficiency testing. Tr. p. 411 LL. 7-16. 
Finally, the DNA expert described the quality assurance program as "an all encompassing system 
of making sure you' re producing the best quality work product." Tr. p. 411 L. 18-p. 412 L. 1. 
Quality assurance is a program of making sure your laboratory is utilizing 
methods that are acceptable methods that follow scientific practice. It ' s a method 
of ensuring that all analysts are properly trained or receiving continual training. It 
includes the proficiency testing which we just talked about. It' s an all 
encompassing system of making sure you' re producing the best quality work 
product. 
Tr. p. 411 L. 18 - p. 412 L. 1. 
Dr. Hampikian testified to the "national standards," testified "based on every textbook in 
the field that I can recall," and testified "based on what I think are clear directives in the standard 
operating procedure." Tr. p. 471 LL. 3-4; p. 461 LL. 16-17; p. 470 LL. 21-23. Dr. Hampikian, 
however, found " [t]hat proper procedures were not followed, that the best practices were not 
followed." Tr. p. 4 70 LL. 17-18. 
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The State DNA expert specifically testified that all the samples in this case "were 
processed on the same day." Tr. p. 428 LL. 25. Because, " [t]his is my normal process." Tr. p. 
429 LL. 9. "In order to be as efficient as possible, I process samples in what we call batches . . . " 
and just have the evidence from "the cases within that batch processing at one time." Tr. p. 422 
LL. 13-20. Samples are not processed on separate days because "it wouldn' t be very efficient to 
process evidence in that manner." Tr. p. 442 LL. 4-5 ; p. 443 LL. 5-9. 
Dr. Hampikian explained, however, that all " [y]ou'd save [is] a walk back to the freezer 
maybe." Tr. p. 467 LL. 20-21. 
There was no reason to put the suspect's DNA in the same place and time 
with the evidence DNA when this laboratory, we know, does samples all the time. 
They could have waited a couple of days and ran this evidence with another case. 
You don't have to run all the samples from one case together. You don' t have to 
run just one case on a plate. 
And if you look at that plate setup - at all of the plate setups in this case, 
they' re not full. The laboratory uses less than half of that plate anyway. So it 
1would have been just a matter of taking this reference sample and swapping it for 
a tube in another case that they' re going to run next week or a few days later. So 
there was no benefit to the lab .. .. 
Tr. p. 467 LL. 4-20. 
The DNA expert continued, "All samples are put on one plate; however only one tube is 
opened at a time." Tr. p. 426 LL. 2-3. Although "[c]ross-contamination is possible," "that' s why 
only one item' s ever opened at a time." Tr. p. 441 LL. 10-17. 
But for Dr. Hampikian, "The point is that they were out at the same time, that the same 
instruments were like used to process them." Tr. p. 465 LL. 2-4. " [T]hey' re done at the same 
place and at the same time, that indicates that everything was out together." Tr. p. 464 LL. 9-11. 
The "buccal sample, and the evidence in this case, . .. which is the left breast swab, that they were 
at the same time out and placed onto an open plate." Tr. p. 463 L. 23 - p. 464 L. 2. 
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So that's what the concern is, right, that they are out at the same time and 
being manipulated at the same space with the same instruments by the same 
person on the same day. 
Tr. p. 476 LL. 6-9. 
r or the DNA expert, the safeguards "aren't foolproof, but typically, if there is any sort of 
contamination that occurs, you will see something in your negative controls." Tr. p. 443 LL. 17-
19. "Anything is possible. It wouldn't be probable, but it's possible." Tr. p. 443 LL. 24-25. 
Dr. Hampikian, however, requires more precision. Testifying in those vague terms, or 
even the more often used "reasonable degree of scientific certainty," is not appropriate. See Tr. 
473 LL. 9-10. 
The kind of best minds in the field have told us not to testify that way 
anymore; that certainty is actually a calculable number that has meaning in 
science, and experts have been testifying about certainty without calculating that. 
So I would not testify that way unless I had some measure of certainty, actual 
calculation of certainty. 1 
Tr. p. 473 LL. 11-17. 
The State's DNA expert felt there was " [n]o" risk of the unknown sample becoming 
contaminated with the defendant's buccal sample. Tr. p. 425 LL. 18-23. 
But Dr. Hampikian clarified that contamination is "stochastic," "[i]t's a chance event." 
Tr. p. 466 L. 17. 
I'd explain it this way: If someone sneezed in this courtroom, there might 
be molecules of, you know, virus particles going out, but it 's a change who of us 
might be hit by one of those, where it lands and would multiply. 
1 On appeal the State argues that Caliz's counsel agreed with the district court that Dr. Hampikian ' s testimony would 
not be helpful to the jury if he cou ld not testify to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. Br. of Resp . p. 18; Tr. 
p. 26 LL. 2-9. However, this quote clarifies the interaction. 
Caliz' s counsel did not agree that the testimony would not be helpful, it agreed with the district court's 
confusion on the use of the standard "reasonable degree of scientific certainty". This testimony of Dr. Hampikian 
clarifies that "certainty" is a calculable number with meaning in the scientific community. It illuminates why Dr. 
Hampikian would not testify to a "reasonable degree of scientific certainty"- because the standard was flawed , not 
because his testimony, or methodology was flawed . It was this point that counsel could not articulate at that 
moment. 
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I[t is] the same case with these plates or these tubes, not every tube is 
going to be hit. It's a stochastic. It's a chance event. So we don't expect to see 
contamination in everything. That makes it hard to detect. And that' s why we 
separate reference samples from evidence for the entirety of the analysis [it] is the 
most sensible approach. 
Tr. p. 466 LL. 10-22. 
The evidence collected from the victim is "precious and irreplaceable." Tr. p. 465 L. 7. 
"[A]ny aerosol, even just a few molecules that- theoretically, a single molecule of DNA 
transferred from one to another permanently and irrevocably contaminates that evidence 
sample." Tr. p. 465 LL. 7-12. 
[If] the suspect' s DNA were aerosolized, let's say, on an instrument or a 
glove and got transferred to the lip of the tube, that evidence would appear to have 
pad the suspect' s DNA originally but actually was introduced in the laboratory. 
Tr. p. 465 LL. 14-19. This type of contamination occurred "there ' s no way to tell." Tr. p. L. 23. 
"[I]t pu~s at risk everything that we do in forensics ." Tr. p. 477 L. 6-8. 
It was Dr. Hampikian' s opinion in this case: "That an undue risk was taken at the 
laboratory that is not in keeping with best practices. That, to me, compromises the evidence 
analysis in this case." Tr. p. 478 L. 23 - p. 479 L. 1. 
E. The district court ' s error in excluding Dr. Hampikian' s testimony was not harmless 
because the most cogent reason for the different verdicts in count 1 and count 2 is the 
DNA evidence. 
The error in this case was fundamental, affecting the fairness and integrity of the fact-
finding process. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973); State v. Perry, 139 
Idaho 520, 523 (2003). It is the type of error that can be reviewed on appeal with or without 
preservation of the error at trial. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). The kind of error 
infringing upon a weighty interest of the accused. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S . 44, 56-58 
(1987); Washington v. Texas , 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1967). The kind of error that the Idaho Court 
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of Appeals is tasked with addressing when it is found, regardless of procedural missteps. See 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). 
However, in this case the error was preserved below so the burden is on the State to 
persuade the court that the error was harmless-beyond a reasonable doubt. Id Although the 
State argues that the error is harmless because the testimony would have been excluded because 
of a discovery violation, such an argument is in error. 
The parties agree that to exclude the testimony in this case based on a discovery 
violation, the district court would need to consider prejudice to the parties, the nature of the 
violation, and "weigh [any] prejudice against the defendant's right to a fair trial." Br. of Resp. p. 
23 citing State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 633 (1997). The issue was argued by appellant in a 
footnote because even if the district court could in some version of reality find a theoretical basis 
for prejudice in this case, the district court found the opposite: 
It does appear that the State has an understanding as to the opinion of Dr. 
Hampikian and it would appear to be a matter of interpretation of the information 
and materials relied upon by the State Lab and Dr. Hampikian. The State now has 
the very information upon which the defense expert relied. 
Memo. Decision p. 6,. Further, the information upon which the defense expert relied what 
defense counsel "received in a subpoena duces tecum and/or supplemental request for discovery 
from the State which is the quantitative data supplied by the Idaho State Police." Tr. p. 22 L. 24 
-p. 23 L. 3. The prosecutor was saying that "we need to supply her with data ... she supplied to 
me." Tr. p. 23 LL. 7-10. 
In this case, no discovery deadline was violated. The State had had all the data since its 
creation by their expert witness. The district court stated that the prosecutor understood the 
opinions. Finally, Dr. Hampikian testified in an offer of proof, during which the State was 
allowed to cross-examine the expert under oath before he testified in front of the jury. 
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Even if this Court were to make the profoundly imbalanced finding that somehow the 
State was prejudiced, and found that the prejudice affected the fairness and integrity of the fact-
I 
finding in this case more that damage of preventing the accused from presenting expert 
testimony on the accused's behalf-the testimony should not have been excluded. The testimony 
of Dr. Hampikian was offered as impeachment/rebuttal testimony. A rebuttal witness is not 
subject to the same disclosure requirements-and arguably not subject to any disclosure 
requirements. See I.C.R. 16(b)(7). 
Ultimately, the jury in this case did not find the victim' s testimony sufficient to find guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The most cogent difference between count 1 and count 2 was the 
testimony regarding DNA evidence. The irrational exclusion of Dr. Hampikian's testimony 
undercut Caliz's ability to defend the case and the conviction should be overturned. 
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CONCLUSION 
Eugenio Caliz-Bautista respectfully request that this Court vacate his conviction and 
remand {his case for further proceedings because the district court baselessly excluded the 
testimony of the defendant' s expert witness. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of June, 2017. 
Calbo & DePew - Jerome County Public Defenders 
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